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ABSTRACT
Mobile edge computing seeks to provide resources to dif-
ferent delay-sensitive applications. However, allocating the
limited edge resources to a number of applications is a chal-
lenging problem. To alleviate the resource scarcity problem,
we propose sharing of resources among multiple edge com-
puting service providers where each service provider has a
particular utility to optimize. We model the resource allo-
cation and sharing problem as a multi-objective optimiza-
tion problem and present a Cooperative Game Theory (CGT)
based framework, where each edge service provider first sat-
isfies its native applications and then shares its remaining re-
sources (if available) with users of other providers. Further-
more, we propose an O(N ) algorithm that provides alloca-
tion decisions from the core, hence the obtained allocations
are Pareto optimal and the grand coalition of all the service
providers is stable. Experimental results show that our pro-
posed resource allocation and sharing framework improves
the utility of all the service providers compared with the
case where the service providers are working alone (no re-
source sharing). Our O(N ) algorithm reduces the time com-
plexity of obtaining a solution from the core by as much as
71.67% when compared with the Shapley value.
1 INTRODUCTION
1Mobile edge computing is a viable solution to support re-
source intensive applications (users). Edge computing relies
on edge clouds placed at the edge of any network [1]. This,
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in contrast with running applications on different mobile de-
vices or deep in the Internet, usually allows one-hop com-
munication [2] between edge clouds and application that
results in reducing application latency. However, a funda-
mental limitation of mobile edge computing is that in con-
trast with traditional cloud platforms and data centers, edge
clouds are limited in resources and may not always be able
to satisfy application demands [1]. Realizing the resource
scarcity problem, the research community has started sev-
eral initiatives to create an open edge computing platform
where edge clouds in the same geographical location can
form a shared resource pool. However, allocating these re-
sources efficiently from the shared pool to different applica-
tions in itself is a challenge.
There have been several attempts in the literature to ad-
dress the resource allocation problem. He et al. [1] stud-
ied the allocation of edge resources to different applications
by jointly considering request scheduling and service place-
ment. Jia et al. [2] discussed edge cloud placement and al-
location of resources to mobile users in the edge cloud in
a Wireless Metropolitan Area Network (WMAN). Xu et al.
[3] discussed edge cloud placement in a large-scale WMAN
that contains multiple wireless access points (APs). How-
ever, most work does not account for the fact that edge re-
sources can belong to different service providers where each
service provider can have a particular objective to optimize
such as security, throughput, latency, etc. Therefore creat-
ing a resource pool and then allocating these resources re-
quires taking different service provider objectives into ac-
count, which results in a multi-objective optimization [4]
(MOO) problem. Furthermore, each service provider has pri-
mary applications that should be prioritized over applica-
tions of other service providers as customer loyalty is an im-
portant part of the cloud business model. For example, Ama-
zon Web Services (AWS) and Microsoft Azure need to satisfy
the demands of their own customers first before they “rent”
resources to other service providers.
In this paper, we attempt to address the aforementioned
shortcomings.We consider an edge computing settingwhere
different edge clouds belonging to different service providers
are placed at the network edge. Each cloud has a specific
amount of resources and particular applications affiliated
with the cloud can ask for resources. All clouds initially at-
tempt to allocate resources to their own affiliated applica-
tions. If a cloud can satisfy its own applications and still have
available resources, it can share themwith other edge clouds
that might need resources. To capture this, we present a Co-
operative Game Theory (CGT) based resource sharing and
allocation mechanism in which different edge clouds share
their resources and form a coalition to satisfy the requests
of different applications. Our CGT based framework takes
into account the fact that different edge cloudsmay have dif-
ferent objectives, which is why traditional single objective
optimization framework cannot be used. The contributions
of this paper are:
(1) We propose a CGT basedmulti-objective resource shar-
ing and allocation framework for edge clouds in an
edge computing setting. We show that the resource
sharing and allocation problem can be modeled as a
Canonical game. The core of this canonical game is
non-empty and the Shapley value [5] lies inside the
core. For small number of players, we show numer-
ically that the Shapley value provides a fair, Pareto-
optimal and stable2 allocation.
(2) We propose an efficient O(N ) algorithm that provides
an allocation from the core, hence reducing the com-
plexity from O(2N ) (for Shapley value).
(3) We evaluate the performance of our proposed frame-
work and show that the resource sharing and alloca-
tion mechanism improves the utilities of game play-
ers.
The paper is structured as: Section 2 provides a primer on
CGT, the Core and Shapley Value. Section 3 presents our sys-
tem model. It also presents the resource sharing and alloca-
tion optimization problem with the game theoretic solution.
Section 4 presents our experimental results while Section 5
concludes the paper.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present a primer on Cooperative Game
Theory, the Core and Shapley Value as they are used later
in the paper.
2.1 Cooperative Game Theory
Cooperative game theory assists us in understanding the be-
havior of rational players in a cooperative setting [6]. Play-
ers can have agreements among themselves that affect the
2No service provider has the incentive to leave the coalition and form a
smaller coalition.
strategies as well as their obtained payoffs or utilities. Be-
lowwe provide some basic definitions related to cooperative
game theory.
CoalitionGame[6]:Any coalition game can be represented
by the pair (N ,v)whereN is the set of players that play the
game, while v is the mapping function that determines the
utilities or payoffs received by the players in N .
Transferable Utility (TU): If the total utility of any coali-
tion can be divided in any manner among the game players,
then the game has a transferable utility.
Characteristic function: The characteristic function for a
coalitional game with TU is a mapping v : 2N 7→ R with
v(∅) = 0.
Superadditivity of TU games: Any game with TU is said
to be superadditive if the formation of large coalitions is al-
ways desired. Mathematically,
v(S1 ∪ S2) ≥ v(S1) +v(S2) ∀S1, S2 ⊂ N , s .t . S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ (1)
Canonical Game: A coalition game is canonical if it is in
the characteristic form and is superadditive.
GroupRational:Apayoff vector x ∈ RN for dividingv(N)
is group-rational if
∑
n∈N xn = v(N).
IndividualRational:Apayoff vectorx ∈ RN is individually-
rational if every player obtains a larger benefit than it would
acting alone, i.e., xn ≥ v({n}),∀n ∈ N .
Imputation: A payoff vector that is both individual and
group rational is known as an imputation.
Core: For any TU canonical game (N ,v), the core is the
set of imputations in which no coalition S ⊂ N has any in-
centive to reject the proposed payoff allocation and deviate
from the grand coalition3 to form a coalition S instead.
Any payoff allocation from the core is Pareto-optimal as
evident from the definition of the core. Furthermore, the
grand coalition formed is stable. However, a core is not al-
ways guaranteed to exist. Even if a core exists, it might be
too large so finding a suitable allocation from the core may
not be easy. Furthermore, as seen from the definition, the
allocation from the core may not always be fair to all the
players. Shapley value can be used to address the aforemen-
tioned shortcomings of the core. Details about Shapley value
can be found in [6].
3 SYSTEM MODEL
Let N = {1, 2, · · · ,N } be the set of all the edge clouds that
act as players in our game. We assume that each player has
a set of K = {1, 2, · · · ,K} different types of resources such
as communication, computation and storage resources. The
n-th edge cloud can report its available resources C(n) =
{C
(n)
1 ....C
(n)
K
} to a central entity, the coalition controller.Here
C
(n)
k
is the amount of resources of type k available to edge
3Grand coalition means that all the players in the game form a coalition.
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node n. VectorC = {
∑
n∈N C
(n)
1 ,
∑
n∈N C
(n)
2 , · · · ,
∑
n∈N C
(n)
K
}
represents all available resources at different edge clouds.
Each edge cloud n has a set of native applications Mn =
{1, 2, · · · ,Mn} that ask for resources. Furthermore, the set
of all applications that ask for resources from the set of edge
clouds (coalition of edge clouds) is given by M = M1 ∪
M2 · · · ∪MN , whereMi ∩Mj = ∅, ∀i , j, i.e., each appli-
cation asks only one edge cloud for resources. The coalition
controller receives a request (requirement) matrix R(n) from
every player n ∈ N
R(n) =
[
r
(n)
1
.
.
.
r
(n)
Mn
]
=
[ r (n)11 · · · · · · r (n)1K
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
r
(n)
Mn1
· · · · · · r
(n)
MnK
]
(2)
where the ith row corresponds to the ith application while
columns represent different resources, i.e., ri j is the amount
of jth resource that application i ∈ Mn requests. The coali-
tion, based on R andC , has to make an allocation decisionX
that optimizes the utilities un(X) of all the edge clouds n ∈
N . The allocation decisionX is a vectorX = {X (1),X (2), · · · ,
X (N )} that indicates how much of each resource k ∈ K is
allocated to application i at edge cloud n ∈ N . Mathemati-
cally,
X (n) =
[
x
(n)
1
.
.
.
x
(n)
|M|
]
=
[ x (n)11 · · · · · · x (n)1K
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
x
(n)
|M|1
· · · · · · x
(n)
|M|K
]
(3)
where x
(n)
ik
is the amount of resource k ∈ K belonging to
player n that is allocated to application i .
3.1 Optimization Problem
In this section, we first present the resource allocation prob-
lem for a single edge cloud (no resource sharing with other
edge clouds). Then we present the MOO problem for the
coalition. For a single edge cloud n ∈ N , the allocation deci-
sion matrix X
(n)
SO
, where SO stands for single objective opti-
mization, is given by
X
(n)
SO
=
[
x
(n)
1
. . . x
(n)
Mn
] t
(4)
The optimization problem is given below:
max
X
(n)
SO
un(X
(n)
SO
) (5a)
s.t.
∑
i ∈Mn
x
(n)
ik
≤ C
(n)
k
, ∀k ∈ K, (5b)
x
(n)
ik
≤ r
(n)
ik
, ∀ i ∈ Mn,k ∈ K, (5c)
x
(n)
ik
≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ Mn,k ∈ K . (5d)
The above optimization problem captures the goal of ev-
ery single edge cloud i.e., maximizing its utility by allocat-
ing its available resources to its native applications4. The
first constraint (5b) indicates that resources allocated to all
users i ∈ Mn cannot exceed capacity. The second constraint
(5c) indicates allocated resources cannot exceed required re-
sources while the final constraint (5d) requires the alloca-
tions to be non-negative. For the cooperative case where
edge clouds work in cooperationwith other edge clouds, we
aim to maximize the utility of our coalition in (6):
max
X
(
wnun(X) + ζn
∑
j∈N, j,n
unj (X)
)
∀n ∈ N (6a)
s.t.
∑
i ∈M
x
(n)
ik
≤ C
(n)
k
, ∀k ∈ K, ∀n ∈ N , (6b)
∑
j∈N
x
(j)
ik
≤ r
(n)
ik
, ∀ i ∈ M,k ∈ K,n ∈ N , (6c)
x
(n)
ik
≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ M,k ∈ K,n ∈ N . (6d)
Here un(X) in (6) indicates the utility that an edge cloud
receives by providing its resources to applications in Mn .
Remaining available resources at edge cloud n can be used
by applications of other edge clouds j ∈ N\n that will be
charged at a rate that edge cloud (each edge cloud acts as a
player in our cooperative game) j would have charged the
application i ∈ Mj had the request been satisfied by edge
cloud j . Henceunj (X) is the utility that edge cloud n receives
for sharing its resources with edge cloud j .wn is the weight
assigned to the utility of player n. ζn is the weight assigned
to the utility unj (X). The purpose of the weights is to high-
light that each edge cloud first allocates resources to its own
applications and then shares the remaining resources with
other edge clouds.
3.2 Game Theoretic Solution
The characteristic function v for our game that solves prob-
lem in (6) is given in (7). We model the resource allocation
and sharing problem (with multiple objectives) in the afore-
mentioned settings as a canonical cooperative game with
transferable utility. We choose a monotone non-decreasing
utility function for our resource allocation and sharing frame-
work. This is because in edge computing, themore resources
provided, the higher is the gain or utility for the edge cloud.
It is highly unlikely that the utility of any edge cloudwill de-
crease with an increase in the amount of resources allocated.
Since the utility function used is monotone non-decreasing,
the game is convex. The core of any convex game is large
and contains the Shapley value [6]. Our goal is to obtain an
allocation from the core as all allocations in the core guar-
antee Pareto optimality and stability of the grand coalition
4Applications that are primarily affiliated with the edge cloud.
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i.e. the allocation decision obtained is Pareto optimal and
no player (edge cloud) will have the incentive to leave the
grand coalition. We first use the Shapley value, that requires
solving 2N−1 optimization problems, to obtain an allocation
from the core and then propose a computationally efficient
algorithm that can provide us an allocation from the core
but does not provide the fairness of the Shapley value.
v(N) =
∑
n∈N
(
wnun(X) + ζn
∑
j∈N, j,n
unj (X)
)
(7)
Algorithm 1 provides an overview of our proposed ap-
proach. We calculate the Shapley value for the players and
assign it to u(R,X). Finally to obtain X, we take the inverse
function of u. As we are using monotonic utilities, we know
that the inverses of the utilities exist. A fundamental issue
with the Shapley value is its complexity. This motivates de-
veloping a more efficient algorithm to obtain an allocation
from the core.
3.3 Reducing the Computational
Complexity
To reduce computational complexity, we propose an algo-
rithm (Algorithm 2) that requires solving only 2N optimiza-
tion problems rather than 2N .
Algorithm 1 Shapley Value based Resource Allocation
Input: R,C, and vector of utility functions of all players
u
Output: X
Step 1: u(R,X) ←0, X ←0, ϕ ←0,
Step 1: Calculate Shapley Value ϕn ∀n ∈ N
Step 2: u(R,X) ← ϕ
Step 3: X ← u−1
max
X
∑
j,n
unj (X) ∀n ∈ N (8a)
s.t.
∑
i ∈M\Mn
x
(n)
ik
≤ C
(n)
k
, ∀k ∈ K, (8b)
x
(n)
ik
≤ r
(n)
ik
, ∀ i ∈ M\Mn,k ∈ K, (8c)
x
(n)
ik
≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ M\Mn,k ∈ K . (8d)
Theorem 1. The solution obtained from Algorithm 2 lies
in the core.
Proof. We need to show that the utilities obtained in
Step 5 of Algorithm 2: a) are individually rational. b) are
group rational, and c) no player has the incentive to leave
the grand coalition and form another coalition S ⊂ N .
Individual Rationality: For each player n ∈ N , the solution
On1 obtained by solving the optimization problem in (5) is
Algorithm 2 O(N ) algorithm for obtaining Core’s alloca-
tion
Input: R,C, and vector of utility functions of all players
u
Output: X
Step 1: u(R,X) ←0, X ←0,O1 ←0,O2 ←0,
Step 2:
for n ∈ N do
On1 ← Solution of the optimization problem
in Equation (5)
end for
Step 3: Update R,C based on Step 2
Step 4:
for n ∈ N do
On2 ← Solution of the optimization problem
in Equation (8) with updated R and C
Update R and C
end for
Step 5: un(R,X) ← O
n
1 +O
n
2 ∀n ∈ N
Step 6: X ← u−1
the utility a player obtains by working alone i.e. it is v{n}.
The value On2 in Step 4 is either zero or positive but cannot
be negative due to the nature of utility used i.e.
un(R,X) = O
n
1 +O
n
2 ≥ O
n
1 , ∀n ∈ N .
Group Rationality: The value of the grand coalitionv{N} as
per (7) is the sum of utilities un ’s and u
n
j ’s. Steps 2, 4 and 5
of Algorithm 2 obtain the sum of the utilities as well. Hence
the solution obtained as a result of Algorithm 2 is group ra-
tional. Furthermore, due to super-additivity of the game and
monotone non-decreasing nature of the utilities, no player
has the incentive to form a smaller coalition. Hence Algo-
rithm 2 provides a solution from the core. 
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To evaluate the performance of the proposed resource shar-
ing and allocation mechanism, we consider a set of game
players where each player has three different types of re-
sources i.e., storage, communication and computation.With-
out loss of generality (W.l.o.g), the model can be extended
to include other types of resources/parameters as well. We
present results for four different settings with 1)N = 3, Mn =
3, ∀n ∈ N ; 2) N = 3, Mn = 20, ∀n ∈ N ; 3) N = 3, Mn =
100, ∀n ∈ N ; and 4) N = 10, Mn = 20, ∀n ∈ N . We
used linear and sigmoidal utilities (see (9)) for all the players.
However, the results hold for anymonotone non-decreasing
4
utility.
un(X) =
∑
i ∈Mn
( K∑
k=1
1
1 + e−µ (x
(n)
ik
−R
(n)
ik
)
)
∀n ∈ N . (9)
µ is chosen to be either 0.01 or 10 to capture the require-
ments of different applications. The request matrix R(n) and
capacity vector C(n) for each player n ∈ N were randomly
generated. The experiments were run in Matlab R2016b on
Core-i7 processor with 16 GB RAM. The optimization prob-
lems were solved using the OPTI-toolbox.
4.1 Value of Coalition
Table 1 shows the utilities of different players in a 3 player-
3 application setting. Player one was assigned a linear util-
ity while player two and three had sigmoidal utilities. It is
evident from the table that the utility of the coalition im-
proves when more players are added. The grand coalition
has the highest utility, verifying the superadditive nature of
the game. The last row shows the Shapley Values (S.V.) for
the grand coalition. Our O(N ) (alg2 in Figure 1) provides
the same value of coalition as Shapley value (due to Pareto
optimality), however players are assigned different utilities
in the coalition. Figure 1 shows the value of coalition for
3 players, and 3, 10 and 100 applications with µ set to 0.01
and 100. The grand coalition achieves the highest coalition
utility for all three cases. As a higher value of µ (i.e., the
slope of the sigmoidal function is steep) puts a stringent
requirement on the edge clouds to satisfy requests of the
applications if it is to gain any utility, we see that that the
overall value of coalition is smaller for µ = 10 when com-
pared with µ = 0.01. Figure 2 shows the utility of a player
without resource sharing and with resource sharing in the
grand coalition in varying experimental settings (µ = 0.01,
µ = 10,Mn = 20, andMn = 100). We show the utility of the
player in the grand coalition both using Shapley value (SV)
and our O(N ) algorithm (alg2 in Figure). Similar trends are
observed in Figure 3. However, we do not calculate the Shap-
ley value for N = 10 andMn = 20 due to the computational
complexity and the utility of the players in the grand coali-
tion is obtained using Algorithm 2. It is evident that all the
players’ utilities improve by sharing resources and taking
part in the cooperative game.
4.2 Time complexity
Computational complexity of the Shapley value is high,which
is why it cannot be used for a large number of players. We
compared the performance of our O(N ) algorithm with the
Shapley value based allocation (given in Algorithm 1) in a
3-player gamewith different number of applications. Exper-
imental results showed that Algorithm 2 reduces the compu-
tation time by as large as 71.67% and as small as 26.6% while
Table 1: Utility (Pay-off) for different coalitions with
µ = 0.01,N = 3,Mn = 3
Coalition
Player Utilities
Coalition Utility
P1 P2 P3
{1} 36 0 0 36
{2} 0 4.37 0 4.37
{3} 0 0 4.31 4.31
{12} 40.17 4.375 0 44.545
{13} 40.31 0 4.313 44.623
{23} 0 8.68 8.68 17.37
{123} O(N ) 44.68 8.68 8.68 62.06
{123} (S.V.) 40.34 10.90 10.81 62.06
Value of Coalition with  =0.01
{1} {2} {3} {12} {13} {23} {123}(SV) {123}Alg2
Coalition
0
200
400
600
800
Ut
ili
ty
3 applications
20 applications
100 applications
Value of Coalition with  =10
{1} {2} {3} {12} {13} {23} {123}(SV) {123}Alg2
Coalition
0
20
40
60
80
Ut
ili
ty
3 applications
20 applications
100 applications
Figure 1: Value of Coalition for 3 players, and 3, 20 and
100 applications with µ = 0.01 and µ = 10
the average improvement was about 49.75%. Figure 4 shows
the calculation time for different user-application settings
with varying µ . We see that in all the settings, our proposed
algorithm outperforms the Shapley value based allocation.
5 CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a cooperative game theory based resource allo-
cation and sharing framework for edge computing that can
efficiently allocate resources to different applications affili-
ated with edge clouds. Our resource allocation and sharing
game is canonical and convex. The core for the game is non-
empty, hence the grand coalition is stable and Shapley value
also lies in the core. Furthermore, due to computational com-
plexity of calculating Shapley value, we presented an O(N )
algorithm that can provide an allocation and sharing deci-
sion from the core. Experimental results showed that edge
5
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Alg2 with  =0.01, M=100
No sharing with  =10, M=100
SV with =10, M=100
Alg2 with  =10, M=100
Figure 2: Utilities in different settings without and
with resource sharing in grand coalition for N = 3
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No sharing ( =0.01) Grand coalition ( =0.01) No sharing ( =10) Grand coalition ( =10)
Figure 3: Player utilities with and without resource
sharing in grand coalition for N = 10 andM = 20
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Figure 4: Comparison of time Complexity
clouds can improve their utility by using our proposed re-
source allocation mechanism and our O(N ) algorithm can
provide us an allocation from the core (guarantee of Pareto
optimality and stability) in a shorter time than the Shapley
value.
REFERENCES
[1] Ting He, Hana Khamfroush, Shiqiang Wang, Tom La Porta, and Sebas-
tian Stein. It’s Hard to Share: Joint Service Placement and Request
Scheduling in Edge Clouds with Sharable and Non-sharable Resources.
2018. To appear in IEEE ICDCS.
[2] Mike Jia, Jiannong Cao, and Weifa Liang. Optimal Cloudlet Placement
and User to Cloudlet Allocation in Wireless Metropolitan Area Net-
works. IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing, 2015.
[3] Zichuan Xu, Weifa Liang, Wenzheng Xu, Mike Jia, and Song Guo. Ef-
ficient Algorithms for Capacitated Cloudlet Placements. IEEE Transac-
tions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, 27(10):2866–2880, 2016.
[4] Jin-Hee Cho, Yating Wang, Ray Chen, Kevin S Chan, and Ananthram
Swami. A Survey on Modeling and Optimizing Multi-Objective Sys-
tems. IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 19(3):1867–1901, 2017.
[5] Lloyd S Shapley. A Value for N-Person Games. Contributions to the
Theory of Games, 2(28):307–317, 1953.
[6] Zhu Han. Game Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks: The-
ory, Models, and Applications. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
6
